Consider a class of exchange economies in which preferences are continuous, convex and strongly monotonic. It is well known that the Walrasian correspondence, de…ned over such a class of economies, is not implementable in Nash Equilibrium. Monotonicity (Maskin (1999)), a necessary condition for Nash implementation, is violated for allocations at the boundary of the feasible set. However, we know since the seminal work of Moore-Repullo (1988) and Abreu-Sen (1990) that monotonicity is no longer necessary for subgame perfect implementation. We …rst show that the Walrasian correspondence de…ned over this class of exchange economies is not implementable in subgame perfect equilibrium. Indeed, the assumption of di¤erentiability cannot be relaxed unless one imposes parametric restrictions on the environment, like assumption EE.3 in Moore-Repullo (1988) .
Introduction
Maskin monotonicity (Maskin (1999) ) is a necessary condition for implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash Equilibrium. This condition has been shown to be restrictive in some cases. For instance, for a class of exchange economies in which preferences are continuous, convex and strongly monotone, it is now well-known that the Walrasian correspondence is not monotonic, (see, e.g., Hurwicz-Maskin-Postlewaite (1995) ). The violation of monotonicity occurs for Walrasian allocations that are at the boundary of the feasible set 1 . Hurwicz (1979) and Schmeidler (1980) have constructed mechanisms that implement the Walrasian correspondence but in which o¤ equilibrium allocations may award negative quantities to some agents. Postlewaite-Wettstein (1989) , Giraud-Rochon (2001) , Dutta-SenVohra (1995) or Tian (1992 Tian ( , 2000 among others, construct mechanisms that implements the (Constrained) Walrasian correspondence 2 . These mechanisms are feasible in and out of equilibrium, and (weakly) balanced. Another line of research has been focusing on strategic market games (see, e.g., Shapley-Shubik (1977) or Dubey-Shapley (1994) ). Papers on noncooperative bargaining such as Gale (1986,a and b), or more recently KunimotoSerrano(2002) provide full implementation of the Walrasian correspondence for economies with a continuum of agents. A boundary assumption that rules out Walrasian allocation at the boundary of the feasible sets is used. To our knowledge, Yildiz (2002) , and the literature on non-cooperative bargaining cited above are the only papers that uses sequential mechanisms. Yildiz's results only cover the two players case, and use assumptions such as uniqueness (and interiority) of Walrasian equilibrium, as well as the singlepeakedness of the o¤er curves in utility space. In our paper, we are interested in trading procedures with a …nite number of agents, and with …nite length mechanisms.
It is now well understood that the class of implementable social choice correspondences rapidly expands when one considers re…nements of Nash Equilibrium as a solution concept. In their seminal papers, Moore-Repullo (1988) (MR in the sequel) and Abreu-Sen (1990) (henceforth, AS) show that monotonicity is no longer necessary for implementation in subgame perfect equilibrium. Suppose that we have two states of the world and , and that outcome a is in the social choice correspondence under but not under . The necessary condition 3 says that there exists a test agent who experiences some preference reversal, when going from one state to the other, between two arbitrary outcomes x and y. Moreover, those two outcomes need only be linked to a, in a particular way, through a string of outcomes. On the other hand, Maskin monotonicity would say that x = a. So, all that is really needed for subgame perfect implementation, in exchange economies, is an agent who experiences a preference reversal between two arbitrary outcomes when going from one state to the other. In particular, it is shown in MR (1988) that the Walrasian Correspondence is implementable in subgame perfect equilibrium. They consider a domain of exchange economies in which preferences are continuous, convex and monotonic. We …rst show that, without further restrictions, the Walrasian correspondence de…ned over this class of economies is not in general subgame perfect implementable. The necessary sequence of outcomes cannot be constructed: di¤erentiability is a crucial assumption. Hence, unless one imposes restrictions on the environment such as assumption EE.3 in MR 4 , implementation of the Walrasian correspondence is not possible. Assumption EE.3 is necessary if one does not impose di¤erentiability, but imposing di¤erentiability does not imply it: assumption EE.3 is su¢ cient but not necessary in such a case. Di¤erentia-bility is actually enough to obtain the local information necessary to elicit whether or not a boundary allocation is Walrasian.
Next, imposing di¤erentiability, the construction of an economically appealing mechanism remains. A canonical mechanism is constructed in MR and AS but, as any general mechanism, it fundamentally lacks economic interpretation. Besides, their game form is complicated and has in…nite message spaces. It involves each agent reporting the entire preferences pro…le 5 , and announcing an integer at each stage of the mechanism. Parallel to the literature on Nash implementation, we expect that the design of tailormade sequential mechanisms is more appealing. Our aim is to provide an alternative -and simpler-game form, that is based on the Walrasian notion of allocation and prices. Moreover, it should …t the very description of Walrasian equilibrium. Given the assumptions on preferences we make, Walrasian allocations exist not only in the interior but also at the boundary 3 See condition C from MR in section 2.
of the feasible sets. Our construction thus takes care (for the …rst time) of the boundary problem that was prominent in the Nash implementation literature. Moreover, our game form doubly implements the Walrasian correspondence in subgame perfect and strong subgame perfect equilibrium.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the class of exchange economy we consider and the notations needed for the paper. In section 3, we highlight the problem that may occur if di¤erentiability is not assumed. In section 4, we present the mechanism and the implementation result. Finally, we provide some …nal comments in section 5.
2 The set-up
Economic environments
There are L in…nitely divisible goods and a set of agents N = f1; : : : ; ng, with n 3. The consumption set of each agent i 2 N is X i = R L + . For each agent i 2 N , R i is the complete and transitive binary relation on R L + indicating (weak) preferences. The associated strict preference and indi¤erence relations are denoted by P i and I i , respectively. The set of possible preferences of each agent i 2 N is de…ned by R i . Denote by R = Q i R i the set of possible preference pro…les. A typical preference pro…le is R = (R i ) i2N 2 R.
Apart from his preferences and consumption set, each agent i 2 N is also characterized by his individual endowment 6 ! i > 0. The aggregate endowment is ! 0. The only characteristics unknown to the planner are the preferences of agents. For each agent i 2 N , X i and ! i are known to the planner and …xed. Only the preferences of agents can vary. An economy is thus a list of preference relation, one for each agent. Formally, an economy is R = (R i ) i2N 2 R. We consider two classes of economies.
Class of economy T : for each agent i 2 N , every R i 2 R i is continuous, convex and strongly monotonic 7 .
Class of economy E: for each agent i 2 N , every R i 2 R i is continuous, convex, strongly monotonic and representable by a di¤erentiable utility function. 6 We order vectors with the usual conventions, , >, . 7 A preference relation Ri de…ned over R A (feasible) allocation is a list of bundle (x i ) i2N 2 R Ln + such that P x i !. Given an agent i 2 N , x i;l 2 R + stands for the quantity of good l received by agent i at bundle x i .
The set of feasible allocations A is,
De…ne by F the set of balanced allocations,
De…ne by P = R L ++ the set of strictly positive price vectors. For each agent i 2 N; denote by B i (p) and B i (p)j x i ! , the budget set and the constrained budget set, respectively, of agent i at a given price p 2 P ,
For each agent i 2 N , given a bundle z i 2 R L + , denote by e B i (p; z i ) and e B i (p; z i )j x i ! , the modi…ed and constrained modi…ed budget sets, respectively, of agent i at price p 2 P ,
Given an agent i 2 N , a preference R i 2 R i and a bundle x i 2 X i , de…ne:
Finally, given the assumptions on preferences 8 , and given a preference pro…le R = (R i ) i2N 2 R, an allocation x 2 F is a Walrasian allocation if there exists p 2 P , such that for each i 2 N , x i 2 B i (p) and x i R i y i , for every y i 2 B i (p).
The Walrasian correspondence W E : R
A associates to each economy R = (R i ) i2N 2 R its set of walrasian allocations W E(R).
Before proceeding to the next section, we recall the necessary condition for subgame perfect implementation introduced in MR, as well as assumption EE.3 made on economic environments.
Condition C: For each R = (R i ) i2N 2 R and R 0 = (R 0 i ) i2N 2 R, R 0 6 = R 9 , and each allocation a 2 W E(R), a = 2 W E(R 0 ), there exists a …nite sequence of allocations fa 0 = a; a 1 ; :::; a k ; a k+1 g such that the following is true: a) For each l = 0; :::; k 1, there exists an agent j l for whom
b) There is some particular agent j k , with R j k 6 = R 0 j k , for whom
there exists an agent i 2 N and two allocations x and y, x; y 0, and such that
Notice that we do not assume EE.3. This assumption ensures that there is at least one agent experiencing a preference reversal inside the feasible sets. We will underline below that, despite its necessity for implementation of the Walrasian correspondence over the class T , it is only su¢ cient over the class E.
Game-form: de…nitions and notations
An extensive game form or mechanism is a game tree with possibly simultaneous moves. More formally, it is de…ned as an array = (N; T; g) where N is the set of players, T a game tree, and g is an outcome function that associates a feasible allocation with each path of play. The set of nodes of the tree T is denoted S. The initial node is s 0 . The set of terminal nodes of the tree T is denoted Z. Let M i be the set of strategies -messages-of player i, and let M s i denote the set of strategies available to player i at node
Suppose the strategy pro…le m 2 M is played. Let g(m) i stand for bundle obtained by agent i 2 N at the allocation prescribed by the path induced by m, that is, g(m). Let g(m; s) denotes the outcome corresponding to m starting at node s. As is common in the implementation literature, we con…ne our attention to pure strategies.
Given an economy R = (R i ) i2N 2 R, the mechanism de…nes an extensive game form ( ; R). A subgame perfect equilibrium of ( ; R) is a strategy pro…le m 2 M such that for all s 2 SnZ and for all i 2 N ,
For each R 2 R, the set of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of ( ; R) is denoted SP E( ; R).
A strong Nash equilibrium of ( ; R) is a strategy pro…le m 2 M such that no coalition of agents have an incentive to deviate simultaneously. That is, for every
A strong subgame perfect equilibrium of ( ; R) is a strategy pro…le m such that for each proper subgame, the pro…le of strategies is a strong Nash equilibrium in that subgame. For each R 2 R the set of strong subgame perfect equilibrium of ( ; R) is denoted SSP E ( ; R). Given a class of economies H, an extensive game form is said to doubly implement in subgame perfect and strong subgame perfect equilibrium the Walrasian correspondence if
We need to introduce one last piece of notation. De…ne by : N ! N the set of one-to-one functions from the set of agents into itself. Let us de…ne by f ( ) the composition of the permutations, where
: : ( n )) : : :) stands for the ordered composition of all permutation of . We call f ( ) a (endogenously determined) protocol. As we shall con…ne our attention to pure strategies, notice that any agent i 2 N , by making a unilateral change from i to 0 i , can induce any protocol from the composition. The use of permutations is in e¤ect quite similar to an integer game or a modulo game. In our case, it captures an idea of anonymity of the mechanism, in the sense that the equilibria should be independent of protocols. Permutations were used …rst in a di¤erent fashion in Thomson (1992) . It was then extended by SerranoVohra (1997) . We make use of this extension.
The need for di¤erentiability
Without stressing the obvious, we brie ‡y clarify here a point that was made in MR. In section 6.3 of their paper, they show that if one considers a class of economies in which preferences are continuous, convex and monotonic, the (full) Walrasian correspondence is subgame perfect implementable. Implicitly behind this statement lies the assumptions made on economic environments, in particular assumption EE.3. We show below that without further restrictions (in particular, without EE.3), the Walrasian correspondence is not, in general implementable, in subgame perfect equilibrium 10 . If one allows indi¤erence sets to have kinks, condition C may not be satis…ed: the sequence of outcomes identi…ed there cannot be constructed inside the feasible set. Imposing smoothness of indi¤erence curves guarantees that, if an allocation is Walrasian in one state but not in another, local information around that allocation and inside the feasible set can be used to construct this sequence of outcomes; and this without assuming EE.3. After all, having R 6 = R 0 does not necessarily mean that an allocation x that is in the SCC under R should be removed under R 0 . Preferences could change in such a way that lower contour sets expands outside of the feasible sets, keeping x in the SCC under R 0 , without the need for EE.3 to be satis…ed. It seems clear that while with non-di¤erentiability, EE.3 is a necessary assumption for implementation of the Walrasian correspondence, it is not if one adds di¤erentiability. This will be highlighted below in example 1.
It is of importance to note that the problem we underline here also pertains to other competitive concept such as the Lindhal correspondence. Once the reader has understood example 1, it is easy to extend the problem to the Kolm triangle and Lindhal allocations as shown below in …gure 3.
We construct an example of an economy with two agents and two goods, for which it is not possible to identify the sequence of outcomes required by condition C in MR, for subgame perfect implementation. The example extends easily to more than two agents economies.
Proposition 1:
The Walrasian correspondence is not implementable in subgame perfect equilibrium in the class of economy T Proof: We construct the following example. Example 1: n = l = 2. There are only two di¤erent possible preference pro…les R = (R 1 ; R 2 ) and R 0 = (R 0 1 ; R 2 ). The preferences are represented by utility functions as follows.
When the pro…le is R, there exists a Walrasian equilibrium (z ; p ) on the boundary of the feasible set. z = ((1; 4); (3; 0)) and p = (2; 1). However, (z ; p ) is not a Walrasian Equilibrium under R 0 . Agent 1 would prefer bundles outside of the feasible set. For instance, the bundle ( The situation is depicted graphically in …gure 1 above.
Since (z ; p ) is not a Walrasian Equilibrium under R 0 , implementability in subgame perfect equilibrium requires that there exists a sequence of outcomes fz ; :::; a; bg and a test agent i 2 N such that
Since agent 2 has the same preferences in both pro…les, agent 1 has to be the test agent. But notice that the preferences of agent 1 di¤er only outside of the feasible set. Hence, such a sequence cannot be constructed unless one Figure 2 allows for infeasibility, which is of course ruled out in our paper. The problem stems from the non-di¤erentiability of u 1 ( ; R 1 ) at z 1 . Without further restrictions on T , the Walrasian correspondence is not implementable.
Q.E.D.
Assuming di¤erentiability does not imply assumption EE.3. Implementability of the Walrasian correspondence and non-di¤erentiability implies that one has to parametrize the environment in a way similar to EE.3. Excluding kinked indi¤erence curves, we do not need further restriction on the environment. If, given two economies, an allocation is Walrasian in one but not in the other, di¤erentiability guarantees that local information around that allocation can be used to construct a (feasible) sequence of outcomes. This can be seen in …gure 2.
The indi¤erence curves of agent 1 under preference R 1 do not have kinks anymore. The allocation z is not Walrasian under R 0 but we can now identify the sequence of outcome fz ; x; yg, as shown in the graph. The allocations x and y can be used to show a preference reversal for agent 1 when going from R 1 to R 0 1 . When di¤erentiability is imposed, the indi¤erence curves going through z under R 1 and R 0 1 have to be di¤erent around z (and inside the feasible set), if z is no longer Walrasian at R 0 1 . In …gure 3 above, we see that this problem applies as well to the Lindhal correspondence. Hence, in the class of economy T ; the Lindhal correspon- Figure 3 dence is not implementable either.
Taking care of the boundary problem
We consider the class of economy E in which preferences are continuous, convex, strongly monotonic and representable by di¤erentiable utility functions. We construct a mechanism that doubly implements the Walrasian correspondence in subgame perfect and strong subgame perfect equilibrium. As it was shown by Hurwicz and Al. (1995) -and this fact is now wellknown-, the Walrasian correspondence de…ned over our class of economies violates monotonicity for Walrasian allocations that are at the boundary of the feasible set. It is not implementable in Nash Equilibrium. However, since the work of MR and AS, we know that monotonicity is no longer necessary for subgame perfect implementation. As we saw above, without further restrictions on T , we cannot implement the Walrasian correspondence. Having clari…ed this issue, the reason for constructing an alternative mechanism to the canonical game form constructed in MR and AR is clear. It is of interest to investigate the design of more tailor-made mechanisms. A simple and economically appealing mechanism that solves the boundary problem is absent from the subgame perfect implementation literature.
The mechanism we construct has three stages. It involves price-allocation announcements at the …rst stage, and is thus more reminiscent of a mar-ket process. Moreover, it …ts closely the description of Walrasian Equilibrium. First, remember that the Walrasian correspondence is implementable in Nash equilibrium over a class of economies in which Walrasian allocations are always interior. We feel legitimate to make the game stops at stage 1 if allocations are in the interior of the feasible set 11 . If, given a price p 2 P , an interior allocation is not Walrasian, at least one agent would like to obtain a di¤erent feasible bundle at that price. Moving along price hyperplanes …ts the Walrasian story: no one should prefer any other a¤ordable bundles. This idea was already used, for instance, in Dutta-Sen-Vohra (1995). Given an interior allocation, the information contained locally in prices is enough to determine whether or not an allocation is Walrasian. When the allocation is on the boundary of the feasible set, this device is not enough anymore. Moves along price hyperplanes can lead to infeasible bundles. Instead, we still rely on the information contained locally in prices, but we use an idea of recontracting. An agent can propose a di¤erent price vector to someone receiving a bundle that is in the interior of his consumption set. These prices, along with the (boundary) allocation agreed upon at stage 1, generates new budget sets -hence the idea of recontracting. If a boundary allocation is Walrasian with price p, then a di¤erent price p 0 , with this allocation as reference point, will automatically generates agents who would like to retrade. On the other hand, if an allocation is not Walrasian and preferred bundles are infeasible, it is possible to propose a di¤erent price vector such that at least one agent -among the agents who receive strictly positive bundleswould want to retrade. To understand this, take a look at …gure 4 below.
The graph is as in …gure 2. The pair (z ; p ) is a Walrasian equilibrium at R but not at R 0 . The price p 0 6 = p is such that for every feasible bundles x 1 6 = z 1 with p x 1 = p ! 1 , we have that p 0 x 1 < p 0 z 1 . When agent 1 has preferences R 1 , there exists x 1 such that x 1 P 1 z 1 and p 0 x 1 = p 0 z 1 . However, when agent 1 has preferences R 0 1 , such a feasible and budgetbalancing x 1 does not exist. This indicates that (z ; p ) is not Walrasian at R 0 . For if (z ; p ) was in fact a Walrasian equilibrium at R 0 , any p 0 6 = p such that p x 1 = p ! 1 and p 0 x 1 < p 0 z 1 ; for any feasible x 1 6 = z 1 ; would create pro…table retrading opportunities for agent 1.
The intuition developed with …gure 3 is exactly what we use in our mechanism for allocations that are at the boundary of the feasible set. The retrading device is used at stage 2.
We shall now present formally the mechanism we use. Mechanism :
) (x; p) i = ( x; p) 8i 2 N and x i 0 8i 2 N , the game stops and the outcome implemented is x.
2) (x; p) i = ( x; p) 8i 2 N and x j;l = 0 for some j and l, then go to stage
i . Agent j = f n ( ) gets the 0 bundle and the other divide the rest equally.
Otherwise if p x 0 i 6 = p ! i , each agent k 2 N receives his endowment ! k . 4) In all other cases, agent j = f n ( ) receives ! j j . Each agent i 6 = ff n ( ) ; f 1 ( )g receives ! i and agent k = f 1 ( ) receives ! k + j .
Stage 2: Agent f 1 ( ) selects an agent f i 6 = f 1 ( ) and announces p 0 2 P . 1) p 0 6 = p, x f i 0 and p 0 is such that there exists feasible bundles y f i 6 = x f i , with p y f i = p ! i and p 0 y f i < p 0 x f i . Go to stage 3.
2) In all other cases, the game stops and x is implemented.
If agent f i 6 = f n ( ), then agent f n ( ) receives 0 and the other agents j = 2 ff 1 ( ); f i ; f n ( )g divide the rest equally. Otherwise, if f i = f n ( ), then agent f n 1 ( ) receives 0 and the other agents j = 2 ff 1 ( ); f i ; f n 1 ( )g divide the rest equally.
If he chooses q f i ( ) , he gets it. Agent f 1 ( ) gets 0. The others divide the rest equally if any.
Theorem 1:
The extensive form mechanism doubly implements in subgame perfect and strong subgame perfect equilibrium the Walrasian correspondence in the class of economies 12 E.
Proof: We …rst show that 13 
SP E( ; R) W E(R).
That is, we proceed to show that if m is a subgame perfect equilibrium of ( ; R), then g(m) 2 W E(R). In order to prove the assertion, consider a subgame perfect equilibrium m, in which m 1 i = (x; p; ) i and g(m) = a.
Suppose not. We have two cases to consider. Case 1: (x; p) j = ( x; p) 8j 6 = i and i 6 = f n ( ). First, if p x 0 f 1 ( ) = p ! f 1 ( ) , agent f n ( ) gets the 0 bundle. We can construct a pro…table deviation for this agent. He deviates by appropriately announcing a permutation so as to be …rst in the protocol, and a di¤erent price-allocation pair. A consequence of such a deviation is that he then receives his endowment majored by a positive epsilon. Since ! i > 0 and preferences are strongly monotonic, this is a pro…table deviation for agent f n ( ). A contradiction.
Second, if p x 0 f 1 ( ) 6 = p ! f 1 ( ) , then everyone receives his endowment. But notice that any agent j 6 = i, by modifying his permutation so as to be …rst in the protocol and announcing (x 0 ; p 0 ) 6 = ( x; p) could obtain ! j + fn( ) . Since k > 0 for every k 2 N and preferences are strongly monotonic, this is a pro…table deviation. A contradiction. Case 2: One agent i = f n ( ) disagrees with the other about the priceallocation pair, or more than one agent makes contradictory announcements of a price and an allocation. In such a case, agent i = f n ( ) receives ! i i and each agent j = 2 ff 1 ( ); f n ( )g receives ! j . Any such agent j = 2 ff 1 ( ); f n ( )g could deviate by announcing a di¤erent permutation so as to be …rst in the protocol -modifying his announcement of a price and allocation if necessary-and receive ! j + fn . Since k > 0 for each k 2 N and preferences are strongly monotonic, this is a pro…table deviation for agent j, a contradiction. Therefore, both cases lead to a contradiction with m being a subgame perfect equilibrium. A consequence of this proof is that a is individually rational.
Suppose not. The game stops at stage 1. The allocation x, with x i 0 8i 2 N , is the outcome of the game but is not Walrasian given the price p. By de…nition of a Walrasian equilibrium, convexity of preferences and the fact that x is an interior allocation, there exists an agent i with preferences say, R i 2 R i , and a feasible bundle x 0 i with p 0 x 0 i = p 0 ! i , and such that x 0 i P i x i . Agent i can deviate at stage 1 by appropriately announcing a permutation 0 i 6 = i so as to be, say, …rst in the protocol, as well as (x 0 ; p) with x 0 i as identi…ed above. In x 0 , agent i assigns, say,
i , which is strictly preferred. This is a pro…table deviation, a contradiction.
As a consequence, if x is an interior allocation, it is the outcome of the game and it is Walrasian given p.
Lemma 3: If x is a boundary allocation, it is the outcome of the game Suppose not. There exists an agent i 2 N for whom x i;l = 0 for some l, and the game goes beyond stage 2. By the rules of the game, one agent k 2 ff 1 ( ); f n ( ); f n 1 ( )g receives the 0 bundle. Consider such an agent k. Agent k modi…es his permutation, if necessary, so as to be …rst in the protocol. At stage 2, agent k announces p 0 = p and whatever name in the remaining protocol. The game stops with x as outcome. Remember that for each agent j 2 N , ! j > 0, p x j = p ! j and p 0. Thus, it is the case that x j > 0 for each agent j 2 N . Hence, by deviating, agent k can obtain x k > 0. By strong monotonicity of preferences, this is a pro…table deviation. A contradiction.
Lemma 4: If x is a boundary allocation, ( x; p) is a Walrasian Equilibrium Suppose not. x is the outcome of the game at stage 2 but ( x; p) is not Walrasian. We have two cases to consider. 1) x is the outcome of the game but there exists an agent i 2 N , with preferences R i 2 R i , for whom
Agent i has a pro…table deviation. He deviates at the …rst stage and modi…es his permutation, if necessary, so as to be last in the protocol. At stage 2, he announces (x 0 ; p) with
In consequence, the game stops at stage 1 and agent i receives x 0 i which is strictly preferred to x i by construction. This case is therefore not possible in equilibrium. The only case left is when there exists an agent i 2 N , for whom
2) x is the outcome of the game but there exists an agent i 2 N , with preferences R i 2 R i , for whom
Since the previous case is ruled out, we have that if
i;l > ! l for some good l. Notice that for this agent i, x i 0. Consider an agent j 6 = i. Agent j has a pro…table deviation. He announces a di¤erent permutation at stage 1, if necessary, so as to be …rst in the protocol. At stage 2, he announces p 0 6 = p such that
and calls agent i. The best response of agent i at stage 3 is to choose x i . Hence, agent j will be awarded x j + 1 n 2 ( ! x i x j ). Since x k > 0 for each k 2 N and preferences are strongly monotonic, this is a pro…table deviation.
Thus, both cases lead to the construction of a pro…table deviation, a contradiction with m being a subgame perfect equilibrium. This concludes the …rst part of the proof.
We have showed that every SPE outcome should be a Walrasian allocation (on the boundary or inside the feasible set). To complete the proof, we prove the opposite direction. That is, we prove that W E(R) SSP E( ; R). Suppose (x ; p ) is a Walrasian equilibrium and that the preference pro…le is R = (R i ) i2N 2 R. Then the following strategies support x as SSPE outcome of ( ; R).
(i) Every agent i announces (x ; p ; I ) i , where I is the identity permutation.
(ii) Let ( p; x) be the unanimously agreed price-allocation pair and f ( ) the composition of permutations at stage 1.
Agent f 1 ( ): a) There exists an agent f i 6 = f 1 ( ) with preferences, say, R f i 2 R f i , and
f i ;l > ! l for some l. Agent f 1 ( ) calls agent f i and announces an appropriate p 0 (given the rules of the game) such that
b) Otherwise, agent f 1 ( ) announces p 0 = p and calls agent f 2 ( ).
(iii) Agent f i chooses the bundle she prefers between x f i and q f i 2 fq
If she is indi¤erent between x f i and any such q f i , then she announces x f i .
The optimality of part (iii) is clear. Agent f i chooses the bundle she prefers between the two that are proposed to her. If she is indi¤erent between the two 14 , she agrees with agent f 1 ( ). Now, notice that agent f 1 ( ) is playing a best response at stage 2. He announces p 0 6 = p only if there exists an agent f i 6 = f 1 ( ) for whom
(by appropriately choosing a price p 0 6 = p, and calling agent f i ). Whenever this condition is not satis…ed, one of the best response of agent f 1 ( ) is to announce p 0 = p. If agent f 1 ( ) does not make the game to stop at stage 2 in such a case, given the strategies of agent f i , agent f 1 ( ) would receive at best x f 1 ( ) or the 0 bundle. Can both these agents gain by deviating? Given the rules of the game, they cannot be made both better o¤ at stage 3.
Finally, since every Walrasian allocation is individually rational and such that for each i 2 N , B i ( p) \ SU C i ( x i ; R i ) = ;, the behavior in (i) is also optimal for each individual agents. Any deviation by a coalition will result in the same outcome (if agents just modify their permutation) or in an outcome that is weakly dominated by any Walrasian allocations (obtaining individual endowments in which it is not possible to make coalitions strictly better o¤). This pro…le of strategies is a strong subgame perfect equilibrium.
Hence, on the equilibrium path, each agent i 2 N announces (x; p) i = (x ; p ). If for each agent i 2 N we have that x i 0, the game stops at stage 1 and x , an interior Walrasian allocation, is implemented. Otherwise, it goes to stage 2 where agent f 1 ( ) con…rms the status-quo coming from stage 1. The game stops and x , a boundary Walrasian allocation, is implemented.
Remark 1
In the previous section, we underlined that the issue raised in example 1 pertains to the Lindhal correspondence. The above mechanism can be adapted to that case. Lindhal equilibrium, being a competitive concept, is well-adapted to the use of prices and allocations as part of the message spaces of agents. In our case, the message space of agents should be enlarged at stage 1. It should incorporate the quantities of public good consumed and personalized price vectors associated to them 15 . An example of such a mechanism is provided in the appendix.
Conclusion
We have shown that, without additional parametric restrictions on the environment, the Walrasian correspondence may not be implementable in subgame perfect equilibrium. Di¤erentiability can be a crucial assumption. Moreover, this issue also applies to another well-known competitive concept, namely Lindhal Equilibrium. Condition C, a necessary condition for implementation in subgame perfect equilibrium, may not be satis…ed in such a case, as shown in example 1. Taking into account this observation, we added di¤erentiability and constructed a sequential game form that takes care of the boundary problem. It doubly implements the Walrasian correspondence in subgame perfect and strong subgame perfect equilibrium. It is thus robust to coalitional deviations. Our mechanism is based on price-allocation announcements and …ts the Walrasian story. In accordance with Nash implementability of interior Walrasian allocations, the game stops at stage 1 when allocations are interior. Beyond stage 1, only boundary allocations are allowed, and a retrading device is used to elicit whether or not the priceallocation pair agents agreed on is a Walrasian equilibrium. Moves along price hyperplanes are at the heart of the Walrasian equilibrium concept. In addition, the mechanism could be modi…ed so as to cover the case of the (full) Lindhal correspondence. Our mechanism is thus well-adapted to competitive concepts. Price-taking behavior is a consequence of the rules of the game. Competition can be maintained even with a small number of agents.
A further extension is to incorporate the important case of two agents. We would then obtain a uni…ed construction. Moreover, having a continuous outcome function, incorporating production, or simply to allow for a more general model in which individual endowments are not known to the designer and can vary across states would constitute possible avenues. We leave these questions open for future research. : y i = y j = y for each i; j 2 N and X
De…ne by P = R L ++ the set of strictly positive price vectors for private goods. For each agent i 2 N , de…ne by Q i = R L ++ the set of personalized strictly positive price vectors for public goods. Denote by Q = Q Q i . For each agent i 2 N; denote by B i (p) and B i (p)j x i ! , the budget set and the constrained budget set, respectively, of agent i at a given price p 2 P and q i 2 Q i ,
(x i ; y) 2 R 2L + j p x i + q i y p ! ix and x i + y ! x :
For each agent i 2 N , given a bundle z i = (x 0 i ; y 0 ) 2 R 2L + , denote by e B i (p; q i ; z i ) and e B i (p; q i ; z i )j x i + y !x , the modi…ed and constrained modi…ed budget sets, respectively, of agent i at price p 2 P and q i 2 Q i , e B i (p; ; q i ; z i ) (x i ; y) 2 R Finally, given the assumptions on preferences, an (x ; y ) 2 F is a Lindhal allocation if there exists p 2 P and personalized price vectors q i 2 Q i , one for each agent, such that P q i = , and for each agent i 2 N , (x i ; y i ) 2 B i (p; q i ) and (x i ; y i ) R i (x i ; y i ) for every (x i ; y i ) 2 B i (p; q i ).
For each R 2 R, denote by LE(R) the set of Lindhal allocations of that economy.
The modi…ed version of our mechanism is the following. Mechanism : Stage 1: m i = ((x; y); p; q; ) i 2 F P Q such that for each i 2 N , p i x i j + q i j y = p i ! jx and P q i j = 8j 6 = i. 1) ((x; y); p; q) i = (( x; y); p; q) 8i 2 N and x i 0 8i 2 N , the game stops and the outcome implemented is ( x; y).
2) ((x; y); p; q) i = (( x; y); p; q) 8i 2 N and x j;l = 0 for some j and l, then go to stage 2.
3) ((x; y); p; q) i = (( x; y); p; q) 8j 6 = i, i 6 = f n ( ), m i = ((x 0 ; y 0 ); p 0 ; q 0 ) 6 = (( x; y); p; q). If p x 0 i + q y 0 = p ! ix , then agent i gets (x 0 i ; y 0 ). Agent j = f n ( ) gets the 0 bundle and each agent k = 2 fi; f n ( )greceives Otherwise, if p x 0 i + q y 0 6 = p ! ix , each agent k 2 N receives his endowment ! kx .
4) In all other cases, agent j = f n ( ) receives ! jx j . Each agent i 6 = ff n ( ) ; f 1 ( )g receives ! ix and agent k = f 1 ( ) receives ! kx + j . 
Theorem 2:
The extensive form mechanism implements in subgame perfect equilibrium the Lindhal correspondence in the class of economies E.
Proof: The proof is very similar to the one of theorem 1. It is therefore omitted.
